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I. INTRODUCTION
Congratulations, you successfully evaded service of process!  You 
moved to a new city, secured a new job, changed your address, and 
made sure no one but your closest family members knew where to find 
you. After settling in to your new abode, you log into Facebook and 
notice you have a message waiting for you in your inbox.  You click the 
bright icon and nanoseconds later a message arrives on your screen with 
an attachment.  You have just been served. 
As a growing resource for litigators serving defendants abroad, social 
media is becoming an important tool attorneys can use to serve difficult-
to-find defendants.1  International courts spearheaded a trend of allowing 
service of process via social media,2 and courts in the United States, in
limited situations, have slowly begun to follow suit.3  With the proliferation 
of social media in the modern world and technological modernization of
courts, why do litigators not simply attempt to serve all defendants 
whom they cannot serve personally through social media?4 
1. See Chris Chiou et al., Texting, Tweeting, Liking . . . and Serving?, LOS 
ANGELES  DAILY J., July 12, 2013, at 1 (describing the international trend of allowing
service through social media as an “alternative” form of service and discussing the 
acceptance of the trend in some U.S. courts to serve defendants abroad); see also Hans 
Van Horn, Evolutionary Pull, Practical Difficulties, and Ethical Boundaries: Using
Facebook To Serve Process on International Defendants, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL 
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 555, 566–68 (2013) (summarizing recent cases that allow service of
process via social media for elusive defendants). 
2. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 566–68 (examining cases that allowed service
via social media in New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom). 
3. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure To Serve You: More Lawyers Look
to Social Networking Sites To Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 14, 14 
(discussing the seminal U.S. decision Mpafe v. Mpafe in which a Minnesota court authorized
the plaintiff to serve an international defendant through social media).
4. As of January 2014, seventy-four percent of adult Internet users utilized social
networking sites.  Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT, http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).  This is
a dramatic increase from 2005, when only eight percent of adult Internet users utilized
780
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One obstacle blocking the widespread use of social media domestically is
the reluctance of many courts to move away from the alternative method
of service historically employed when a defendant cannot be served 
through other means—publication in a local newspaper.5  Traditionally, 
when a defendant cannot be found or is actively evading service, 
newspapers have been the primary method for providing constructive 
notice to a defendant in a way that comports with due process.6  Today,
courts still authorize service by newspaper publication.7 
As some courts begin to allow service via social media, service by
social media and service by publication are competing for the last place
in the service hierarchy.  Courts only authorize both types of service as a
last resort when traditional service, such as personal service or service 
by mail, is impracticable.8  In deciding which type of alternative service 
to authorize, courts are choosing between service by publication and
social media,9 with some authorizing service by social media only after 
service by publication has been attempted.10  In today’s world however,
the use of social media is growing rapidly while newspaper readership is 
declining quickly.11  When procedural safeguards are established, service
social networking sites.  Id.  For an explanation of other ways courts are engaging with
social media, see generally John G. Browning, Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your 
Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. 
MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 204 (2013) (discussing the use of social 
media during discovery and trial, and the ethical quandaries it brings). 
5. See, e.g., Lauren A. Rieders, Note, Old Principles, New Technology, and the 
Future of Notice in Newspapers, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2010). 
6. See id. at 1023. 
7. See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cardenas, 292 F.R.D. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa.
2013); Ptarmigan Owner’s Ass’n v. Lewis H. Alton, LLC Mont. Invs. 212, 2013 MT 69, 
¶ 8, 369 Mont. 274, 298 P.3d 1140. 
8. See Rieders, supra note 5, at 1025 (“Mullane stands for the principle that
newspaper notice should only be used as a last resort . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012
WL 2086950, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (denying service of process through 
Facebook but allowing service by newspaper publication). 
10. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 566–67 (describing an Australian case where
the court allowed service via Facebook after the defendants moved and changed jobs and
phone numbers, service by publication failed, and hiring a private investigator turned up
nothing).
11. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (reporting the recent increase 
in social networking site usage by adults). In contrast to social networking, the 
percentage of Americans who read print newspapers has fallen over the last decade from 




























      
  
    
 
via social media is a method much more likely to notify a defendant of
an action against him than service by publication.12 
This Comment addresses why service by social media better meets the
constitutional standard for service of process than publication and advocates 
change at the state level, including suggesting arguments attorneys can
use to persuade courts to allow them to serve defendants over social media. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the constitutional and statutory evolution 
of service of process beginning with traditional personal service, moving
on to service by publication, and ending with electronic service of
process. Part III explores recent cases in which courts have authorized
and denied social media service for serving both parties abroad and parties
in the United States.  Part IV analyzes why the reasoning behind the cases
involving foreign parties can and should be applied to situations involving
domestic parties.  Part V discusses ethical concerns about authenticating
a social media profile and determining whether a party is actually likely
to receive service that suggest why some courts may be reluctant to
allow social media service.  Part VI discusses the benefits to social media
service and why social media service is constitutionally superior to 
newspaper publication.  Finally, Part VII proposes a judicial and a
legislative change to move courts into the modern day. 
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process is rooted in both constitutional and statutory law.13 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”14  In balancing the interests of the state with the interests of
the individual, procedural due process mandates that an individual be 
afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.15  To pass constitutional 
muster, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”16  The due
Print Newspapers Continues To Decline, PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 11, 2012), www.pewresearch. 
org/daily-number/number-of-americans-who-read-print-newspapers-continues-decline/. 
12. Only twenty-three percent of the population read print newspapers.  See Number of 
Americans Who Read Print Newspapers Continues To Decline, supra note 11; see also 
Social Networking Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (noting that seventy-four percent of adult 
Internet users use social networking sites). For a discussion about the ethical concerns 
and procedural issues of serving a defendant through social media, see discussion infra
Part V; see also Van Horn, supra note 1, at 568–71. 
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
15. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950). 
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process requirement also places jurisdictional limitations on the states to
keep them from abusing their power.17 The Constitution requires that a 
court establish personal jurisdiction over an individual before a court can
pass judgment on that individual.18  Therefore, notice and personal
jurisdiction are intrinsically connected, and both are required for a court 
to issue a binding judgment.19 
Historically, personal jurisdiction was rooted in state sovereignty and
was based on territorial boundaries.20  The Supreme Court laid out these 
bases in the central personal jurisdiction case Pennoyer v. Neff.21 Pennoyer
established that a defendant must be personally served within the forum 
state in order to subject the defendant to the power of that state’s courts.22 
The Court discussed whether service by publication was acceptable to 
serve an out-of-state defendant.23 It held that service by publication is
permissible to bring the defendant within the court’s jurisdiction in an in 
rem proceeding where an out-of-state resident owns property in the 
forum state.24  In an in personam action to determine a defendant’s
personal rights and obligations, however, service by publication is never 
sufficient to subject the defendant to a binding judgment.25  By placing
such restrictions on service, Pennoyer greatly limited the scope of service, 
including service by publication. 
As technological advancements made interstate travel and
communication easier, the strict territorial standard set forth in Pennoyer
became impractical.26  Thus, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
17. See id. at 311–14 (describing how the personal jurisdiction requirement
challenges the power of the state by limiting the court’s right to adjudicate against parties 
who reside outside the state).  The Court notes that the state has a “vital” interest in 
adjudicating cases involving its residents; however, this interest must be balanced by the 
individual interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 313. 
18. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
19. See id. at 729. 
20. See id. at 724. 
21. See id. 
22. Id. at 725. 
23. Id. at 727. 
24. See id. (“The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform
him, not only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any
proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.”). 
25. Id. 
26. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); see also 













    
   
 
 





   
  
  




   
the Supreme Court established the modern standard for personal 
jurisdiction: for service to be proper, a defendant must have minimum 
contacts with the forum state.27  In  International Shoe, the Court held 
that where a defendant is not physically present in the forum state, he
must have “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”28  Although the Court in International Shoe did 
not specifically address service by publication, it held that substituted 
service is proper where there is reasonable assurance that the defendant 
will actually receive notice.29  Thus, although International Shoe expanded
the standard for personal jurisdiction, it reaffirmed the requirements for 
service of process.30 
In 1950, the hallmark case Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. expanded on Pennoyer and International Shoe, specifically addressing 
the constitutional standard for service by publication.31  The Court in 
Mullane held that where a defendant is missing or a defendant’s identity
is not known service by publication is a constitutional alternative to 
other methods such as personal service, posting at the defendant’s
residence, or service by mail.32  The Court acknowledged that although
Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1499–1500 (2009) (describing how growth
and commercial expansion in the United States made the Pennoyer standard “unworkable”).
Through advances in the twentieth century, people could more easily travel from one
jurisdiction to another, making the territorial standard from Pennoyer a hindrance to the 
concept of personal jurisdiction and necessitating a move toward a more flexible
standard.  See Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal
Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 381 (2003) (explaining how 
mobility and globalization prompted an elastic standard for personal jurisdiction, which
then necessitated an equally accommodating service of process standard). 
27. 326 U.S. at 316. 
28. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
29. See id. at 320 (holding that mailing notice to the defendant’s office was
reasonably calculated to apprise it of the suit against it).
30. The Court noted that, historically, “[P]resence within the territorial jurisdiction of a
court was a prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding.”  Id. at 316. 
The Court expanded personal jurisdiction over people and entities with “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state based on the “quality and nature of the activity in relation 
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due 
process clause to insure.” Id. at 319. The Court also held that service by mail met the 
standards for proper service articulated in previous Supreme Court cases such as 
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463, McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), and Conn. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 619 (1899). Id. at 320. 
31. 339 U.S. 306, 316–17 (1950) (reasoning that although newspaper publication
is much less likely than personal service to result in a party actually being notified of the 
action, where a defendant’s address or interest is unknown, service by publication meets 
the constitutional standard for service of process).
32. Id. at 318–19. The Court also held that service by publication is not
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personal service is the preferred method of informing a defendant of an
action, publication is an alternative method that in some situations is 
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action.”33  Because the beneficiaries in the
case could not be ascertained with “due diligence,” the Court found that 
it was “not reasonably possible or practicable to give [a] more adequate 
warning [than service by publication].”34  Service by publication was 
constitutionally acceptable because it was no more likely to fail to give 
actual notice than any other method that the legislature could potentially 
prescribe.35 
In addition to passing constitutional muster, notice must be authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36  In 1934, Congress passed the
Rules Enabling Act, giving the power of law to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.37  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) provides that 
service on a defendant located within the United States may be made by
complying with the applicable state rules, personally serving the defendant, 
delivering the process to a residence, or leaving the process with someone
authorized to receive it.38  If a defendant resides abroad, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(f) provides that a defendant may be served internationally
by any “internationally agreed means of service” or by a method “reasonably 
calculated to give notice.”39 
33. Id. at 313–14 (citing Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463). The Court noted, however, 
“Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper . . . .  [Thus, i]n weighing [publication’s] 
sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice we are unable to regard this as 
more than a feint.” Id. at 315.
34. Id. at 317. 
35. Id.  Actual notice is the goal because the right to be heard promised by the 
Fourteenth Amendment “has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter 
is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.” Id.
at 314. 
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). “Internationally agreed means of service” includes those
authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention).  FED. R. CIV. P.
4(f)(1). The Hague Service Convention does not prohibit service by e-mail.  See, e.g.,
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, 295 F.R.D. 259, 261–62 (S.D. 







   
  
 













     
 
    
    
      
     
  
   





The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly state that 
newspaper publication is an acceptable means of serving a defendant,
either domestically or internationally.40  However, state law generally 
authorizes service by publication as an alternative means of serving an
elusive defendant.41  Therefore, because Rule 4(e)(1) authorizes a party 
to serve a defendant by “following state law for serving a summons,”
service by publication is authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
under Rule 4(e) when state law allows it.42  Additionally, because Rule 4(f) 
allows service on foreign defendants by any method reasonably calculated
to give notice, any method that meets the constitutional standard, such as 
service by publication under Mullane, is also authorized under Rule 4(f) so 
long as it is not prohibited by international agreement.43 
Like service by publication, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not explicitly authorize service via social media for serving a domestic
or international defendant.44  Like all forms of service, service via social 
media must meet constitutional and statutory standards.45  When serving 
an elusive international defendant, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
are relatively lax; service via social media is permissible so long as it meets
Mullane’s constitutional standard and is not prohibited by international 
agreement.46 
Conversely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure present a taller 
hurdle to serving a domestic defendant via Facebook or other social media
site than they do to serving an international defendant.  Like the rules 
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)–(f).
41. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 
(1950); see also infra Appendix A (detailing which states allow service of process by
newspaper publication). Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia specifically
direct that a plaintiff serve an elusive defendant by publication, and the other twenty-five
states have catchall provisions or provisions that do not foreclose service by publication. 
See infra Appendix A. 
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1); see, e.g., Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11 
Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012)  (holding that where
New York law allowed service by publication, publication was an acceptable means of 
serving the defendant). 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)–(f).
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). This rule provides that the constitutional catchall 
provision in Rule 4(f)(3) is only applicable when the Hague Convention does not apply.
Id.  This is not a problem; if the address of the person being served is unknown, the 
Hague Service Convention does not apply. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 560.  Sixty-
eight states are party to the Hague Service Convention. Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON 
PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17 (last
updated Aug. 19, 2014).  Thus, so long as there is no international agreement prohibiting
service via social media, service via Facebook and similar sites is likely allowable.  See 
Van Horn, supra note 1, at 560. 
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governing service on foreign defendants, Rule 4(e) neither explicitly 
permits nor prohibits service by social media.47  However, unlike Rule 
4(f), Rule 4(e) does not have a catchall provision to encompass any
nonprohibited methods of service.48  Instead, Rule 4(e) authorizes service
by methods allowed under the law of the forum state or the state in 
which the defendant is being served.49 Thus, when serving a domestic 
defendant, state law governs service via social media.50  If a state explicitly
allows social media service or has a catchall provision similar to the rule
for serving an international defendant that allows any method of service 
that is constitutionally permissible, courts have the ability to order 
service through social media to serve an elusive defendant whose 
address is unknown.51  In these states, attorneys should seek the opportunity
to serve elusive defendants through Facebook or other types of widely 
used social media.52  By contrast, social media service is impermissible
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
48. See id. (listing four specific ways to serve a domestic defendant). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See infra Appendix A. Twenty-one states have catchall provisions, many of 
which allow any type of service “reasonably calculated to give the party actual notice of 
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” See, e.g., infra Appendix A(2)(a); see
also Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 450 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (“In the
proper circumstances . . . plaintiffs need not wait for the [state’s service statute] to be 
amended in order to be able to resort to service by e-mail.  Our state courts already have
the power to grant them the relief they seek.”).
52. This Comment is not suggesting that Facebook is the only platform that could
be used to serve defendants but is using Facebook as the prime example of a site that is
widely used and reliable.  Any type of widely used social media platform that has indicia 
of reliability similar to Facebook, as discussed in Part V, infra, falls under this Comment’s 
proposal.  In order for courts to know which social media sites are broadly used, the 
court can examine a site’s traffic by downloading the statistics about a site’s “unique 
monthly visitors.”  In July 2014, for example, Facebook had over 167 million unique monthly
visitors.  Facebook.com, COMPETE SITE ANALYTICS, http://siteanalytics.compete.com/face
book.com/#.UxzmllwspuY (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).  In the same month, Twitter had 
over 51 million unique monthly visitors, and LinkedIn had almost 47 million.  Twitter.com, 
COMPETE SITE ANALYTICS, http://siteanalytics.compete.com/twitter.com/#.Uxznb1wspuY 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2014); Linkedin.com, COMPETE SITE ANALYTICS, http://siteanalytics.
compete.com/linkedin.com/?gateway=1#.Uxzoc1wspuY (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).  Sites
that have usage statistics similar to these can be thought of as widely used. Additionally, the
court can examine a site’s demographics to determine that adults in the country where
the defendant resides use the site.  Facebook, LinkedIn, Pinterest, and Twitter are popular
among adults in the United States.  See MAEVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2013, at 1 (2013), available at www.pewresearch.org/2013/
























       
 
in states that do not have catchall provisions for allowing social media
service.53  In order for attorneys to affect more targeted, practical service
on elusive defendants, these states must amend their civil procedure 
rules to include either a provision specifically allowing social media
service or a catchall provision allowing service by any constitutionally 
permissible means.54 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MEDIA SERVICE IN THE COURTS: 
THE EVOLUTION FROM E-MAIL SERVICE TO SERVICE
VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
Courts set the stage for allowing social media service by allowing 
electronic service on international defendants under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).55  For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a trial 
court’s decision to allow service via e-mail in the 2002 case Rio Properties, 
Inc. v. Rio International Interlink.56  In  Rio Properties, the appellate
court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
allowed a plaintiff to serve an international defendant by e-mail after the 
plaintiff’s initial attempts to serve the defendant failed.57  The court 
reasoned that the trial court appropriately used its discretion to balance
the limitations of e-mail service against its benefits and concluded that
under Federal Rule 4(f) e-mail service was reasonably calculated to 
Facebook in 2013, twenty-two percent used LinkedIn, twenty-one percent used Pinterest, 
and eighteen percent used Twitter). Other countries have additional popular social 
networking sites, such as Bebo in the United Kingdom, Orkut in Brazil, Badoo in Russia, 
SkyRock in France, Tuenti in Spain, Nasza-Klasa.pl in Poland, StudiVZ in Germany,
and Renren in China.  Sorav Jain, 40 Most Popular Social Networking Sites of the World, 
SOC. MEDIA TODAY (Oct, 6, 2012), http://socialmediatoday.com/soravjain/195917/40-most-
popular-social-networking-sites-world.
53. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia specify publication as the 
method of serving an elusive defendant.  See infra Appendix A(1).
54. Currently, twenty-one states have catchall provisions that allow service by any
constitutionally permissible means.  See infra Appendix A(2). 
55. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018–19 (9th Cir.
2002); Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560, 563 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2004): D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004); Viz Commc’ns, Inc. v. Redsun, No. C-01-04235 JF, 2003 WL
23901766, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-
0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); In re Int’l Telemedia 
Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d
704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
56. 284 F.3d at 1018. 
57. Id.  Initially, the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant in the United States, 
but the defendant’s attorney and international courier both declined to accept service on the
defendant’s behalf.  Id. at 1016.  The plaintiff also hired a private investigator to locate 
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notify the defendant and was not prohibited by any international 
agreement.58  The court in Rio Properties noted that e-mail service was 
not only proper in this case but because the defendant preferred to
communicate through e-mail, it was the method most likely to notify the 
defendant of the pending action.59  The court emphasized, “[W]hen faced 
with an international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the
federal court, email may be the only means of effecting service of 
process.”60 
Following Rio Properties, courts in other circuits began to allow e-
mail service on elusive foreign defendants.61  In Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 
the Western District of New York allowed service via e-mail, holding 
that Rule 4(f)(3) was an “independent basis for service of process,” and
where a defendant regularly used e-mail, service via e-mail comported 
with the Mullane standard for due process.62  Similarly, in  Hollow v. 
Hollow, a New York Supreme Court approved e-mail service where a 
defendant fled to Saudi Arabia and communicated with a plaintiff 
exclusively through e-mail.63  Many other courts followed suit, employing 
the Rio Properties balancing test and recognizing a trend toward allowing
electronic service.64 
58. Id. at 1018. 
59. Id. at 1017–18. 
60. Id. at 1018. 
61. See Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 560, 563 
(E.D. Tenn. 2004): D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004); Viz Commc’ns, Inc. v. Redsun, No. C-01-04235 JF, 2003
WL 23901766, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-
0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002).  At least one other court had previously decided the 
issue. See In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000). 
62. 2002 WL 1628933, at *2. 
63. 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708. 
64. See Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of International 
E-mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285, 297 (2008). Since Rio 
Properties, several courts have authorized e-mail service by analogizing to that case.
See D’Acquisto v. Triffo, No. 05-C-0810, 2006 WL 44057, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 
2006); Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D. W. Va. 2005); Popular
Enters., 225 F.R.D. at 563; Viz Commc’ns, 2003 WL 23901766, at *6; Ryan, 2002 WL
1628933, at *2; Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d, at 708.  Some courts have also rejected e-mail 
service, distinguishing Rio Properties. See, e.g., Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, No. 
04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding that 
contrary to Ryan and Rio Properties where the e-mail addresses of defendants were “the
mechanisms by which the defendants conducted business, presumably on a daily basis,”
service via e-mail was not constitutional where the plaintiff did not show that the
789
































Expanding on this trend, courts recently began allowing plaintiffs to
serve elusive foreign defendants through social media, using a balancing 
test similar to the method articulated in Rio Properties.65 In 2011, a 
district court in Minnesota authorized a plaintiff to serve a foreign defendant
through e-mail, Facebook, Myspace, “or other social networking site[s]” 
in Mpafe v. Mpafe.66  The plaintiff in this case sought a divorce from her
husband, but she had not seen him in years and believed that he had left 
the United States.67  The court held that online service was sufficient 
where the defendant could not be located and other attempts at service 
were unsuccessful.68  The court considered service by publication in a
legal newspaper, but concluded that service by publication “is antiquated 
and is prohibitively expensive.”69  The court stated that it was unlikely that
the defendant would ever see the notice in a legal newspaper and 
technology “provides a cheaper and hopefully more effective way of 
finding [the defendant].”70  Thus, the benefits of social media service far 
outweighed the burdens of publication to the Mpafe court.
Following Mpafe, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York allowed a plaintiff to serve defendants in India via e-mail and
Facebook.71  In the 2013 case Federal Trade Commission v. PCCare247
Inc., the court authorized alternative service after the defendants failed to 
comply with a preliminary injunction and did not respond to the plaintiff’s 
motions.72  The court in PCCare247 began its analysis by examining
whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized service by
Facebook or e-mail.73  Citing Rule 4(f)(3), the court determined that the
defendant would be likely to receive the notice if it were sent by e-mail); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Domains By Proxy, No. Civ.A.3:04 CV 741(SR.), 2004 WL 1576703, at *1 (D. Conn. 
July 13, 2004) (finding that e-mail service was not permissible where the plaintiffs had 
not shown that the e-mail would be reasonably likely to reach the defendants).
65. See Order for Service by Publication on the Internet, No. 27-FA-11-3453 
(Minn. 4th May 10, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/70014426/Mpafe-v-
Mpafe-order [hereinafter Mpafe Order]; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., 
Nos. 12 Civ. 7186(PAE), 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 2013 WL 5288897, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 
7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013). 
66. Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
67. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 566. 
68. See Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 
WL 841037, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).  The plaintiff originally sought to serve 
the defendants via e-mail, Facebook message, and publication but narrowed its request
after realizing the prohibitive cost of publication. Id. at *3. 































[VOL. 51:  779, 2014] Keep Your Facebook Friends Close 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
proposed means of service were not prohibited by any international 
agreement;74 thus, the court could allow the proposed service if it met 
the due process requirements compulsory under the Constitution.75 
The court held that the plaintiff’s proposal to serve the defendants by
e-mail and Facebook message together comported with due process.76 
Such service was “highly likely” to reach the defendants because they
ran “an online business, communicate[d]. . . via e-mail, and advertise[d]
their business on their Facebook pages.”77  The court first addressed e-
mail service, reasoning that the court could be reasonably certain the e-
mail would reach the defendants because the provided e-mail addresses
were used to set up accounts for the defendants’ business and one of the 
defendants e-mailed the court from his address.78  In light of evidence 
that the defendants regularly used Facebook, service via Facebook also 
comported with due process.79 
In a related case, Federal Trade Commission v. Pecon Software Ltd., 
the same court held that the plaintiffs could not serve the defendants via 
Facebook message.80  The plaintiffs made multiple attempts to serve the
defendants by traditional methods, but the defendants’ addresses could
not be verified.81  In contrast to PCCare247, the court in Pecon Software
was unable to confirm that the defendants actually operated the Facebook
accounts in question.82  The court noted that it could not “say with 
confidence, without actually viewing the Facebook pages and verifying 
74. Id. at *3. 
75. Id. at *4. 
76. Id. at *6. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at *4. 
79. Id. at *5–6; see also Chiou et al., supra note 1, at 1 (describing the holding of 
the case). In some cases, courts have been more reluctant to authorize Facebook service. 
For example, in Pecon Software, the court denied service of process via Facebook, 
holding that the plaintiffs had not shown that service via Facebook would be “highly
likely” to reach the defendants.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., Nos. 12
Civ. 7186(PAE), 12 Civ. 7188(PAE), 12 Civ. 7191(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 12 Civ. 
7195(PAE), 2013 WL 4016272, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013).  The court held that 
although Facebook service was permissible under Rule 4(f)(3) it did not comport with 
due process under the circumstances of the case. Id. at *4–8. The court distinguished 
PCCare247, noting that unlike that case the plaintiffs did not provide the court with a 
screenshot of the Facebook pages at issue in order to enable the court to verify the 
information. Id. at *8. 
80. Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8. 
81. Id. at *2. 


























the information allegedly listed thereon, that service by Facebook message 
would be highly likely to reach defendants” because the individual
defendants bore common names and their e-mail addresses varied over 
time.83 
The court in Pecon Software denied the plaintiffs’ motion without 
prejudice, and the plaintiffs thereafter submitted additional evidence and 
renewed their motion for alternative service.84  This time, the court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to serve all defendants via Facebook and 
e-mail.85  The plaintiffs offered evidence that the defendants’ e-mails
were consistent with those registered to the Facebook accounts and the 
employers listed on the Facebook accounts were consistent with the 
defendants’ actual employers.86  By curing the evidentiary defects in 
their initial motion, the Plaintiffs persuaded the court that social media 
service was reliable and beneficial.87  Therefore, the court determined
that service via Facebook was authorized under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(f)(3) and that it met the constitutional standard for service 
of process because the plaintiffs showed that there was a “high likelihood” 
that such service would reach the defendants.88 
In contrast to permitting service on international defendants under 
Rule 4(f), courts have been reluctant to allow service via social media on 
domestic defendants under Rule 4(e).  In a 2012 case, Fortunato v. 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that serving a domestic defendant by Facebook message 
was too unreliable and instead directed the plaintiff to publish notice in
five different local newspapers.89  In  Fortunato, the defendant, Chase 
Bank, sought to implead Fortunato into the action against it.90  Chase
hired a private investigator but was unable to locate Fortunato or discern
her physical address.91  Thus, Chase sought leave to serve Fortunato by 
e-mail, Facebook message, publication, and delivery to Fortunato’s 
mother.92 
83. Id. 
84. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., Nos. 12 Civ. 7186(PAE), 12 Civ.
7189(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 2013 WL 5288897, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013). 
85. Id. at *3. 
86. Id. at *2. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7,
2012); see also David D. Siegel, Court Refuses Service by Facebook as Too Unreliable;
Instead Directs Service by Publication in Series of Local Newspapers, SIEGEL’S PRAC. 
REV., June 2012, at 3 (summarizing Fortunato).
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The court began by determining that the alternative methods of service 
proposed by Chase were authorized by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
4(e).93  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize these types of 
service because New York’s civil procedure rules contain a catchall
provision allowing service in any manner the court directs when service 
by traditional means is “impracticable.”94  The court held that serving 
Fortunato by traditional means was indeed impractical.95  Thus, Rule 
4(e)(1) authorized service by any nontraditional method.96  The court
then analyzed which, if any, of the alternative methods of service met 
the constitutional due process standard.97  The court held that neither
service by Facebook nor by e-mail was reasonably calculated to apprise 
the party of the action under the facts of the case.98  The court reasoned 
that Chase failed to offer any facts indicating that Fortunato would likely
receive the summons and complaint at the given e-mail address or the
Facebook profile was in fact maintained by Fortunato.99  The uncertainties
of attempting service via Facebook were too concerning to convince the 
court to allow social media service on the facts of the case.100 After 
similarly dispensing of delivering service to Fortunato’s mother,101 the
court resorted to allowing service by “the only remaining method”: 
publication.102 
93. Id. 
94. See id.; see also infra Appendix A(2)(n). 
95. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (reasoning that Fortunato’s history of 
providing fictional addresses coupled with Chase’s attempts to personally serve Fortunato and
diligent search for an alternative place of residence showed that Fortunato cannot reasonably
be served using the traditional methods). 
96. Id. at *1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) (allowing domestic service of process
according to the laws of the state where the district court is located).
97.  Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
98. Id. (citing the constitutional standard articulated in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. 
Veles Ltd., No. 06. CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007)). 
99. Id.  The court stated, “Service by Facebook is unorthodox to say the least, and 
this Court is unaware of any other court that has authorized such service.”  Id.  Additionally, 
the court reasoned that because “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or
incomplete information,” there is no way for the court to confirm that the profile belongs 
to Fortunato.  Id.
 100. Id. 
101. See id. at *3 (reasoning that delivering the summons and complaint to Fortunato’s 
mother did not meet the constitutional standard because Fortunato and her mother were 
estranged and had not been in touch for years). 

































Following in New York’s footsteps, in 2013, a Missouri district court
addressed service via Facebook in Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard.103 
The court in Joe Hand Promotions held that Missouri law did not authorize
electronic service, and thus service of process via Facebook was not 
permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.104  In Joe Hand 
Promotions, the plaintiffs first attempted to serve the defendants at multiple
vacant addresses.105  Additionally, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the
defendants at their place of business, but the business was closed every time
the process server attempted to serve the defendants.106  After arguing
that they had exhausted all of the standard service means and incurred 
substantial expense, the plaintiffs moved the court to allow them to serve 
the defendants by sending a message containing the summons and
complaint to the Facebook accounts bearing the name of the defendants’ 
businesses.107 
The court began by evaluating whether domestic service through 
Facebook was authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.108 
The court reasoned that although Rule 4(f) authorizes electronic service 
on foreign defendants, Rule 4(e) authorizes service on domestic defendants 
“only on the individual, their agent, . . . delivery to their abode,” or “by 
‘following state law.’”109  Missouri law, however, provides that, if 
traditional methods of service fail and the defendant cannot be found,
publication is the proper method of serving the defendant.110  Thus, because
Missouri does not authorize electronic service, service by Facebook was
not proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiffs’ 
only option was publication.111 
The court also went beyond its holding by analyzing electronic service
and considering the fact that the plaintiffs’ efforts to serve the defendants 
were not comprehensive.112  The court found that the plaintiffs did not
exhaust traditional methods of service because they attempted service at
103. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 WL 
4058745, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013). 
updated and actively used by one of the defendants.  Id.
104. Id. at *2. 
105. Id. at *1. 
106. Id.
 107. Id.  The plaintiffs discovered two Facebook pages for the defendants’ businesses 
108. Id.
 109. Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)–(f)). 
110. Id. (reasoning that where Missouri law did not allow service via e-mail, service via
Facebook is definitely prohibited).  The relevant Missouri statute provides that where a 
defendant cannot be found, the court “shall issue an order of publication of notice.”  MO.
R. CIV. P. 506.160(3). 
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only one residential address, they used only one search engine to find the
defendants, and they tried to serve the defendants’ business only when it 
was closed.113  The court explained that even if state law did authorize
social media service, the plaintiffs must first exhaust the traditional 
methods of serving a defendant before substitute service is proper.114  Thus,
the court stated in dicta that it would not order service via Facebook in 
this case even if state law allowed it.115 
The last few years of case law shows how the courts go about weighing 
of costs and benefits of nontraditional methods of service and how they
decide what means of alternative service they will allow, both when
service is authorized to serve international defendants under Rule 4(f) 
and when state law allows domestic service.116 
IV. BRINGING THE INTERNATIONAL CASES HOME: HOW COURTS CAN 
LOOK TO CASES DECIDED UNDER FEDERAL RULE 4(F) TO 
ALLOW SERVICE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA UNDER 
FEDERAL RULE 4(E) 
As the cases show, there are currently two ways plaintiffs can serve 
defendants via social media.  So long as service comports with due process, 
a plaintiff can serve a foreign defendant under Rule 4(f)(3) when such 
service is not prohibited by international agreement.  Additionally, a 
plaintiff can serve a domestic defendant under Rule 4(e)(1) when such 
service is permissible under state law.117  No state has a provision explicitly
allowing service of process via social media.118  However, states that do 
have catchall provisions in their civil procedure rules generally allow 
service by any means “reasonably calculated to give notice.”119  Thus,
these state law catchall provisions merely require that a method of
113. Id.
 114. Id.
 115. Id. The court found the benefits of service via Facebook did not outweigh the 
facts that anyone can make a “fake” Facebook profile and the defendants may not actually
receive a notification that they have a new Facebook message. Id. at *1 n.1, *2 n.2. 
116. Though not explicitly, the courts in the above cases balanced the limitations of
social media service with the benefits of social media service, similar to the analysis
articulated in Rio Properties. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007,
1018 (9th Cir. 2002). 
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)–(f).
118. See infra Appendix A. 
119. See infra Appendix A(2) for a compilation of states that have catchall service 



























   
 





   
   
service meet the constitutional standard articulated in Mullane before a 
court can allow its use.120  Similarly, because Rule 4(f)(3) allows service
by any method not prohibited by international agreement, a court may
allow service by any method that meets the constitutional standard for 
due process provided the method is not prohibited by such an agreement.121 
Thus, regardless of whether the court is deciding to allow social media
service for an elusive defendant under Rule 4(f)(3) or by state law under 
Rule 4(e)(1), the determination often comes down to the same issue:
whether social media service is reasonably calculated under all of the 
circumstances to apprise the defendant of the pending suit.122 
Facebook has significant user bases both in the United States and
abroad.123  Courts should use a similar analysis to determine whether
social media service meets the Mullane requirements in cases decided
under Rule 4(f) and cases decided under the catchall provision of Rule 
4(e).124  Although foreign and domestic service of process cases are
120. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950)
(citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (explaining that a method must be
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action”).
121. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 
WL 841037, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (reasoning that because service via Facebook 
was not prohibited by any international agreement, the court would allow service via 
Facebook if it was constitutional). 
122. See supra Part III, discussing how both the foreign and domestic cases turn on
whether Facebook service meets the constitutional standard.  This comparison, however, 
only applies to states that have catchall provisions in their civil procedure rules.  As 
explained in supra Part II, states without catchall provisions would need to amend their
civil procedure rules before service via social media could be authorized.  On September 
12, 2014, a New York family court became the first U.S. court to allow domestic service
through Facebook.  Julia Marsh, Reuven Fenton, & Bruce Golding, Judge Oks Serving 
Legal Papers Via Facebook, NEW YORK POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/
09/18/judge-oks-serving-legal-papers-via-facebook/.  In Matter of Noel B. v. Maria A., a 
family court magistrate allowed a father to serve a petition to terminate child support on 
the mother via Facebook and mail after the mother moved without leaving a forwarding
address, neither the mother nor her children would answer calls or text messages, a Google 
search was unsuccessful, and the mother maintained an active Facebook profile and “liked” 
pictures as recently as July, 2014.  Id.
123. In September 2012, Facebook had over 243 million users in Europe, 236 
million in Asia, 134 million in South America, and still more in Africa, Mexico, the 
Middle East, and Australia. Facebook Users in the World, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm (last updated May 12, 2014).  Facebook, 
Inc. also has two offices abroad in Dublin, Ireland, and Hyderabad, India. See Press Release,
IDA Ireland, Facebook Opens New EMEA Headquarters in Dublin (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.idaireland.com/news-media/press-releases/facebook-opens-new-emea-h/; Facebook
Opens Office in India, TIMES INDIA (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:03 PM), http://timesofindia.india
times.com/tech/tech-news/Facebook-opens-office-in-India/articleshow/6659525.cms.
124. For example, courts can balance the concerns they have about using social



















    
  
     
  
      






[VOL. 51:  779, 2014] Keep Your Facebook Friends Close 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
governed by different rules, concern about whether service is actually
likely to reach a defendant is common to both types.  The scarce case
law on this issue demonstrates that the cases involving foreign and 
domestic defendants are more similar than different.125  For example, 
PCCare247, Pecon Software, and Fortunato all turned on whether or not
service by Facebook met the constitutional standard for due process.126 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure play an important role in determining 
whether or not social media service is authorized, but once the court
determines that social media service is allowed under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, whether a defendant resides internationally or 
domestically carries little weight in the analysis.127  The differences in 
the outcomes of the cases are not based on whether Rule 4(f) or a catchall
provision under Rule 4(e) is applied but rather the facts of the cases.
In PCCare247, for example, the court found that service via Facebook
comported with due process for three reasons.128  First, service via Facebook
would be effected simultaneously with service via e-mail.129  Second, the
defendants registered their Facebook accounts with verifiable e-mail
addresses, suggesting that they actually operated the Facebook accounts
identified.130  Third, the defendants’ Facebook pages listed their job titles
at the defendant companies and the defendants were Facebook friends, 
demonstrating a likelihood that a Facebook message would reach the 
service in Rio Properties. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007,
1018–19 (9th Cir. 2002). 
125. See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *3 (citing analysis from Fortunato even
though Fortunato involved a domestic defendant). 
126. See id. at *5; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., Nos. 12 Civ. 
7186(PAE), 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 2013 WL 5288897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 18, 2013); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 
2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).  Joe Hand Promotions is distinguishable because the
court ultimately held that service via Facebook was not authorized under state law.  Joe
Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 WL 4058745, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Aug. 12, 2013). Mpafe is relatively unhelpful for this particular analysis because the
court did not cite any facts of the case.  See Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
127. The courts in the cases involving both foreign and domestic defendants gave
weight to the fact that the defendant could not be found, regardless of the defendant’s 
last known location.  See, e.g., Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
128. PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *5. 
129. Id. (reasoning that “if the FTC were proposing to serve defendants only by
means of Facebook, as opposed to using Facebook as a supplemental means of service, a 
substantial question would arise whether that service comports with due process”).
130. Id.
797






























defendants.131 The combination of these three factors convinced the
court that service via Facebook and e-mail comported with due process.132 
Pecon Software turned on the same three factors.133  First, the plaintiffs
proposed to serve the defendants by both e-mail and Facebook.134  Second, 
the court verified the defendants’ e-mail addresses, and the plaintiffs
showed that the Facebook accounts were registered to the same 
addresses.135 Third, the defendants’ Facebook profiles showed they
worked for the defendant companies.136  Although Fortunato involved 
domestic parties, it too turned on the same three factors as PCCare247
and Pecon Software. Like the defendants in PCCare247 and Pecon
Software, the defendant in Fortunato requested to implead a third party
plaintiff by both e-mail and Facebook message.137  Unlike the two 
international cases, however, the defendants did not set forth any facts to
show the court that the plaintiff actually operated the Facebook account 
or that she would access the site or the e-mail listed on it.138 
Further, in PCCare247, decided under Rule 4(f), the court went so far 
as to distinguish Fortunato even though that case was decided under 
Rule 4(e).139  This shows that courts are aware that the analysis in the
cases involving foreign defendants is applicable to cases involving 
domestic defendants.140  The differences in the case outcomes are not 
based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but on whether the court
determines that social media service is actually likely to notify a 
defendant and that the profile in question actually belongs to the defendant 
131. Id.  The plaintiffs were able to offer this support by showing the court a
screenshot of the defendants’ Facebook pages. See id. at *5. 
132. Id. at *5–6. 
133. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., Nos. 12 Civ. 7186(PAE), 12 Civ. 
7189(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 2013 WL 5288897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013). 




137. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950,
138. Id.
139.  The court in PCCare247 reasoned, 
In Fortunato, the court denied authorization for service by Facebook because it 
found that plaintiff “has not set forth any facts that would give the Court a 
degree of certainty that the Facebook profile plaintiff’s investigator located is 
in fact maintained by defendant or that the email address listed on the Facebook 
profile is operational and accessed by defendant.” 
  The proposed Facebook service in this case does not suffer from that defect. 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *5
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to be served.141  Thus, in the domestic arena where only one family court
has not yet authorized service by Facebook, the foreign cases present a way 
to convince the courts to allow social media service.  The cases suggest 
that, at a minimum, three factors must be present in order to convince a 
court under either Rule 4(f) or a state catchall provision that the benefits 
of social media service outweigh the risks.142  These requirements were 
applied to service via Facebook in the cases thus far, but can be applied 
to any type of widely used social media service.143 
First, the motion should clearly propose that social media service be 
effected along with e-mail service.144  This double service increases the
chances that the defendant will actually receive notice but is not enough 
to convince the courts to allow social media service.145  Additionally, the
plaintiff should present evidence that shows the Facebook page is 
actually the defendant’s.146  The plaintiff should offer a screenshot of the
defendant’s social media profile to the court and verify that profile’s 
registered e-mail address belongs to the defendant.147  Finally, the
plaintiff should present some evidence that shows the defendant actually
uses his or her Facebook profile.148  The plaintiff can show the defendant’s
active status through a screenshot that reflects recently updated job titles,
141. These two qualifications are reminiscent of the Ninth Circuit’s balancing test 
in Rio Properties, where the court held that any reservations about e-mail service were 
outweighed by the benefits because the defendant preferred to communicate by e-mail
and it was clear that the e-mail address was actually registered to the defendant.  Rio 
Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002). 
142. Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at 
*5; Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
 143. See supra note 52 (explaining some criteria for how to determine if a social 
media site is widely used). 
144. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 5288897, at *2; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at
*5. 
145. See Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (denying the motion to allow social 
media service even though the plaintiffs proposed to serve the defendants through 
Facebook and e-mail). 
146. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at
*5; Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
 147. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at
*5; Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.  The screenshot of the profile shows personal
information that evidences that the profile actually belongs to the defendant, such as their 
name, picture, job, and hometown, and the e-mail provides further evidence of the defendant’s 
identity. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
148. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037,

































pictures, or friend acceptances.149  By showing the defendant actually
uses his or her profile, the plaintiff shows that service through a message
on the profile would likely reach the defendant.150 
These minimum requirements go beyond the cases themselves to the
heart of constitutional due process.  Under Mullane, the goal of service 
of process is to actually inform the defendant of the action against him.151 
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is serving a defendant in the United
States or in a foreign jurisdiction, the goal of service is to notify the
defendant that they have a lawsuit to defend.152  Therefore, it is logical that
courts would inquire similarly into the nature of social media service for 
both foreign and domestic parties to determine whether social media 
service is likely to actually notify a defendant, or where actual notice
may be impossible, at least whether social media is “not substantially less 
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary
substitutes.”153 
A. Arguing for the Courts To Order Service via Social Media 
In order for plaintiffs in domestic cases to serve elusive defendants via 
social media, plaintiffs in states with catchall provisions should argue to 
the courts that service should be effected via social media.  They should
do so by using the three factors articulated above and the successful
evidence the parties presented in the Rule 4(f) cases.  In most cases today, it
makes sense for the parties to specifically argue for Facebook service to 
serve an elusive defendant rather than other social media platforms
because some courts have already determined that Facebook can meet
the Mullane standard.154  Facebook is the preferred social networking
149. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037,
at *5; Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
150. See Pecon Software, 2013 WL 4016272, at *8; PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037,
at *5; Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
151. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) 
(“But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. 
The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional 
validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably 
certain to inform those affected . . . .”).
attorneys should shy away from arguing for other widely used social networking sites 
152. Id.
 153. Id.
 154. See, e.g., PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *5–6.  This is not to say that 
such as Twitter or LinkedIn when there is evidence that service meets the three minimum 
requirements, especially where a defendant does not have a Facebook profile.  See Van 
Horn, supra note 1, at 567 (describing a case in England where the court authorized 
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site in the United States where seventy-one percent of adult social media
users have a Facebook profile.155  This amount of site usage is followed
by LinkedIn at twenty-two percent of adult social media users and Pinterest
at twenty-one percent.156  Facebook has about 500 million average monthly
users with more than 125 billion friend connections.157  Facebook is an
ideal method for serving elusive defendants, not only because of its 
popularity but also because of its practicality.  Facebook service is
preferable because Facebook allows a user to send a private message to 
another user, even when the sender is not a Facebook friend of the recipient.158 
Thus, a lawyer would not need to request to be a defendant’s Facebook 
friend—an action that would likely have both ethical and practical
concerns—before serving a defendant over Facebook.  Additionally,
Facebook is convenient because Facebook allows message senders to
attach documents.159  Therefore, attorneys can attach the summons and 
complaint to the message, which is preferable not only to other social
networking sites but also to newspapers where the complaint cannot be 
attached.
Serving a defendant via Facebook is comparable to personally serving 
a defendant or serving a defendant through mail.  On Facebook, each
user has a profile where they post personal information and pictures.160 
An attorney can use this profile to find the defendant who needs to be 
served, and the personal information contained makes it easy to verify a 
user’s identity.161 On Facebook, anyone can send another user a personal
message.162  That person is then notified over Facebook, and through e-
mail alerts if they so choose, that they have a new message in their
155. Social Networking Fact Sheet, supra note 4. If another social media site becomes
the preferred social media platform and is similarly reliable, lawyers should adapt and
argue for service using that site. 
156. Id. 
157. MSN Money Partner, Inside Facebook’s Money Machine, MSN MONEY (May
17, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://money.msn.com/technology-investment/post.aspx?post=869a1b6c-
0bb7-47b3-ac0a-25d10f6a5404. 
158. Sending a Message, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/www/32653479
4098501(last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
159. How Do I Add an Attachment to My Message?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/help/121288674619000 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
 160. How To Post and Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/333140
160100643 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
161.  For a discussion of concerns about fake profiles, see infra Part V. 



























   
 
inbox.163  Similar to regular mail, this message system delivers notices
straight to the user it is addressed to.164  Also similar to personal service, 
a defendant on Facebook will be notified personally that they received a 
message.165  All the defendant has to do is open the message to know that
they have been served. 
B. Amending States’ Civil Procedure Rules To Authorize Substituted 
Service by Any Constitutional Means 
Before attorneys can argue for social media service, suit must be
brought in a state with a catchall provision in its civil procedure rules.166 
Suits brought in states without these catchall provisions should work at
the legislative level to change the state service rules to include catchall
provisions.  Specifically, these state legislatures should draft service rules
that allow for alternative service by any means reasonably calculated to
notify the defendant.  The challenge lies in convincing the state legislatures
rather than convincing the courts to amend entrenched rules. 
The legislature should amend the rules to include catchall provisions 
rather than explicitly authorizing service of process through social media 
because a general rule will likely be easier to pass.  Newspapers often 
hold a monopoly on substituted service, with many states authorizing 
alternative service only by newspaper publication.167  Newspaper lobbyists 
have successfully opposed legislation that would further decrease the 
revenue of print newspapers.168  Newspapers receive some revenue from
163. Id.
 164. Id.
 165. Id. 
166. See infra Appendix A(2); see also supra notes 39–53. 
167.  See infra Appendix A(1) (indicating that twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia authorize service on an elusive defendant only by newspaper publication); see 
also, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 WL
4058745, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013) (reasoning that the only method of service allowed
on an elusive defendant under Missouri state law is service by newspaper publication). 
168. See Amy Gahran, Lobbying for Online-Only Legal Notices: How Community
Publishers Can Take Action, USC KNIGHT DIGITAL MEDIA CENTER (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.knightdigitalmediacenter.org/blogs/kdmceditor/2012/07/lobbying-online-only-
legal-notices-how-community-publishers-can-take-action (detailing a 2012 bill that failed
to pass in New York); Andria Krewson, N.C. Legislators Turn Back Effort To Take Legal 
Notices Out of Newspapers, GLOBAL VUE (May 14, 2011), http://globalvue.Wordpress.com/ 
2011/05/14/n-c-legislators-turn-back-effort-to-take-legal-notices-out-of-newspapers/ (discussing
a North Carolina bill that died in the legislature); Jim Turner, Online Foreclosure Notices Fail 
in House Committee, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012, 3:55 AM), http://www.sunshinestate 
news.com/story/online-foreclosure-notices-fail-house-committee (detailing a Florida law that
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government notices, which are funded by taxpayers.169  Although many
states have attempted to pass legislation requiring online-only legal notices 
—potentially saving the government millions of dollars—newspapers have
aggressively lobbied to keep such laws from passing.170  As a result of 
this lobbying, these bills have not passed.171  These same newspaper
lobbyists may oppose any change to the rules that may negatively impact
newspaper revenues, including a change from publishing private legal 
notices in newspapers to posting them online.172 As such, it would likely 
be easier for the legislature to pass a catchall provision than one 
explicitly allowing for substituted service via social media. 
V. THE RELUCTANCE TO MOVE TOWARD SOCIAL MEDIA SERVICE: THE 
ETHICAL CONCERNS OF SERVING DEFENDANTS ONLINE
Even in the event that legislatures do pass catchall provisions, and 
even if parties do have the evidence required by the case law to pass 
constitutional muster, courts may still be reluctant to allow service via 
social media because of ethical concerns.173 
169. See Kevin O’Keefe, Newspapers To Lose Their Monopoly on Publishing 
Legal Notices, REAL LAW. HAVE BLOGS (Jan. 8, 2012), http://kevin.lexblog.com/2012/01/08/
newspapers-to-lose-their-monopoly-on-publishing-legal-notices/. 
170. Id. (mentioning how local governments strapped for cash argue that allowing 
them to post legal notices on their own websites could save millions of dollars, up to seventy
million dollars a year).
171. See Gahran, supra note 168; Krewson, supra note 168; Turner, supra note 
168. 
172. As a side effect of readership decline, newspaper revenue is suffering because 
newspapers do not have as many advertisers as they did in the past.  See Better Know a Lobby
—Newspaper Association of America, Colbert Nation (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.
colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/223281/march-31-2009/better-know-a-lobby—
newspaper-lobby.  In 2005, for example, the newspaper industry brought in $47.4 billion 
in revenue from print advertising and $2 billion from online advertising.  Rick Edmonds 
et al., Newspapers: By the Numbers, State Media, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/news 
papers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-the-numbers/ (last
visited Sept. 11, 2014).  By contrast, in 2011, the industry made $20.7 billion in revenue 
from print advertising and $3.2 billion from online advertising, less than half of the total
advertising revenue made in 2007.  Id. Even though yearly online advertising revenue is
steadily increasing, it is dwarfed by the reduction of yearly print advertisement revenue.  Id.
 173. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 
2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (reasoning that service by Facebook is
“unorthodox”). 
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A. Authenticating a Facebook Profile 
In denying the defendant’s motion for substituted service to implead a 
third party plaintiff, the court in Fortunato announced its skepticism 
regarding the reliability of Facebook service, noting, “[T]he Court’s 
understanding is that anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, 
fake, or incomplete information.”174  This is a legitimate concern because in
order to authorize social media service in a manner consistent with due
process, the court must be able to not only verify the profile the attorney
plans on messaging is in fact the defendant’s but also confirm the receipt
of service.175  However, in the cases where social media service has been 
allowed, the defendant’s identity has been verifiable in some way.176 
Because users create personal profiles, usually by including pictures and 
personal information, authenticating a profile can be done circumstantially
and relatively easily, especially if the plaintiff knows the defendant.177 
In PCCare247, for example, the defendants were active Facebook 
users.178  In that case, the defendants had recently updated their professional 
and social activities and advertised their businesses on their Facebook 
pages.179  The court was also able to crosscheck the defendants’ Facebook, 
e-mail, and places of employment to confirm that the active users of the
Facebook profiles were in fact the defendants in the case.180  The ability 
to verify a defendant’s identity gives social media service, like Facebook
service, an edge over traditional alternative service.  In service via 
publication, the publisher has no idea whether the defendant even reads 
the newspaper, much less if he will actually see the notice.181  With social 
media service, by contrast, the court can readily verify that a defendant 
uses his or her profile, giving a much greater chance that the defendant
will actually see the service.182 
174. Id.
 175. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 568. 
176. See Mpafe Order, supra note 65; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 
12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013). 
177. See Van Horn, supra note 1, at 568. 
178. See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *6. 
179. Id. at *5–6. 
180. Id. at *6. 
181. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) 
(explaining that it is unlikely newspaper publication would actually notify a defendant of
a lawsuit against him).
182. See Pedram Tabibi, Facebook Notification—You’ve Been Served: Why Social 
Media Service of Process May Soon Be a Virtual Reality, 7 PHOENIX L. REV. 37, 46 
(2013) (discussing how the United States is moving toward a system where social media 
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This is not to say that people cannot create fake or deceitful profiles.
To create a Facebook profile, for example, a user only needs to enter a 
first and last name, e-mail address, gender, and date of birth, and create a
password.183  Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities require
that a person who creates a profile provide “accurate and up-to-date”
information.184  Thus, the profile’s creator should technically be the person 
that the profile details. These Terms of Use, however, are subject to the
conspicuous disclaimer that Facebook is provided “as is without any 
express or implied warranties” and is not “responsible for the actions,
content, information, or data” of its users.185  In 2012, Facebook admitted 
that it had around eighty-three million fake profiles accounting for 8.7% 
of its global users.186  These included duplicate profiles, “user-misclassified
profiles,” such as profiles created for businesses or pets, and “undesirable” 
profiles that breach Facebook’s terms and conditions.187  Still, attorneys
should be able to confirm whether a profile actually belongs to the correct
person.  For example, the attorney can look at pictures, personal information 
such as birth date and name, and even crosscheck lists of Facebook 
friends with the defendant’s known associates.188  Similarly, by crosschecking 
information on Facebook with other verified information about the 
defendant, the court can authenticate the profile.189  The more information is
available to verify that a profile belongs to the correct person, the more
likely a court will be convinced that social media service is actually 
likely to reach the defendant.190  At a minimum, however, an attorney
should be able to present evidence to a judge that a profile contains the 
defendant’s name, a verifiable e-mail address, and at least one personal
183. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
184. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
185. Id.
 186. Mark Sweney, Facebook Quarterly Report Reveals 83m Profiles are Fake, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/aug/02/facebook-
83m-profiles-bogus-fake.
187. Id. 
188. See Noel Towell, Lawyers To Serve Notices on Facebook, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (Dec. 16, 2008, 10:35 AM), http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/ 
lawyers-to-serve-notices-on-facebook/2008/12/16/1229189579001.html. 
189. See FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at 
*5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).






















   




detail such as job title or birthdate, similar to the evidence presented in 
Pecon Software and PCCare247.191 
Moreover, although authorizing service via Facebook may discourage 
some potential defendants from using the website or encourage some to
hide their profiles, this fear has not played out in reality.192  Additionally, 
Facebook privacy settings often have holes allowing for access.193 For
example, even if a defendant changes his or her profile to “private,” 
Facebook recently changed its privacy policy to allow Graph Search, a 
feature that permits users to search for any past posts that have been
shared with them, including public posts by nonfriends.194  When a person 
changes his or her profile to a private setting, they choose whom to share 
information with.195  However, with the addition of Graph Search, any 
information posted prior to a person’s privacy setting change is still
searchable and readable.196  Thus, if a potential defendant was at one time a
Facebook friend of the plaintiff, but the defendant decided that they
would block the plaintiff so they could not view their profile, attorneys
could still access the plaintiff’s profile.197 In doing so, the attorneys could 
look through the defendant’s older posts to verify that the defendant’s
profile actually belongs to the defendant before having a server contact 
the defendant.198  In order to get around this hole, the defendant would
have to go through any past posts that the plaintiff or members of the 
public could see and hide all of them.  The more privacy settings a user 
employs, however, the more difficult it will be for the court to verify the
defendant’s identity.  In the event the defendant is unverifiable, service 
by publication may still be the preferred last resort option to constructively
serve a defendant. 
191. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pecon Software Ltd., Nos. 12 Civ. 7186(PAE), 12
Civ. 7189(PAE), 12 Civ. 7192(PAE), 2013 WL 5288897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 
2013); PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *5. 
192. See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *6; Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
193. See 3 Tips About Search Privacy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/
graphsearch/privacy (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
194. See id.
 195. See How Can I Make My Profile COMPLETELY Private and NOT Appear on
Search?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/community/question/?id=1015156950
2816839 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
196. See 3 Tips About Search Privacy, supra note 193. 
197. See id.
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B. The Likelihood that the Defendant Will Actually     
Receive Notice via Facebook 
In addition to requiring a defendant to be verifiable, due process also
requires that a defendant actually be likely to receive notice.199  This  
requirement can often be satisfied when a message is sent through
Facebook. In Mpafe, for example, a Minnesota court reasoned that 
serving a foreign defendant by Facebook message was the most practical 
method and the most likely method to comply with constitutional 
standards.200 Moreover, if a person opens a message on Facebook, the
sender will always be notified.201  This policy is another safeguard that
makes service by Facebook superior to service by publication and many
other social media platforms.  Perhaps the most comparable social media
site to serve a defendant on is LinkedIn.  Although LinkedIn allows the 
court to verify a defendant’s identity similar to Facebook, LinkedIn does 
not notify a sender if the receiver has opened a message.202 
Even if an attorney cannot show that a defendant actually received 
notice through social media, the fact that the message was sent to the
defendant’s inbox may be sufficient in situations where the defendant 
has proven to be otherwise elusive.203  In some cases where courts have
allowed service via e-mail, such as Rio Properties, courts have held that 
even though the plaintiff could not show the defendant received actual
notice the likelihood of the defendant receiving electronic service was 
greater than receiving other types of service.  Therefore electronic
service was reasonably calculated to notify the defendant.204  Similarly, 
the court in PCCare247 acknowledged that “Facebook is a relatively
novel concept, and . . . it is conceivable that [the] defendants will not in 
fact receive notice by this means.”205  This acknowledgement, however,
did not preclude the court from authorizing service via Facebook, noting, 
199. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950). 
200. See Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
201. Messages can be sent to anyone on Facebook, and Facebook marks a message
as “seen” when the person receiving the message has opened it. Sending a Message, supra
note 158. 
202. Sending Messages to Connections and Contacts, LINKEDIN, http://help.linkedin.
com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1645 (last reviewed June 6, 2014). 
203. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). 
204. See, e.g., id.
205. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, 

























   
    
“[H]istory teaches that, as technology advances and modes of communication 
progress, courts must be open to considering requests to authorize 
service via technological means of then-recent vintage, rather than 
dismissing them out of hand as novel.”206 
Although ethical concerns do exist when serving a defendant through
social media, these concerns can be allayed with procedural safeguards 
in most cases.207  Thus, the fact that social media service must be affected
carefully should not preclude the courts from implementing social media 
service.
VI. RAISING THE BAR: ESCAPING THE ENTRENCHMENT IN 
PUBLICATION, AND WHY SOCIAL MEDIA SERVICE 
BETTER MEETS MULLANE’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD
Currently, many courts usually authorize service by publication as the 
preferred method for alternative service when a defendant cannot be
served through traditional means.208  Service by publication, however, is
becoming an outdated method of service that is constitutionally inferior 
in many cases to service via social media. 
A. Social Media Service Is More Economical than 
Service by Publication 
Some courts that have allowed service via Facebook have cited the 
prohibitive cost of service by publication.209  In Mpafe, for example, the
court reasoned that publication in a newspaper is “antiquated and 
prohibitively expensive.”210  Comparatively, publishing notice in newspapers
is more expensive than sending a message over the Internet.211  Newspapers 
charge varying amounts to publish legal notices.212 While the cost of 
206. Id.
207. In addition to due process considerations, other ethical considerations arise 
when an attorney seeks to serve a defendant on social media regarding privacy concerns 
and ethical representation.  For a discussion of these issues, see Van Horn, supra note 1, 
at 570. 
208. See infra Appendix A(1); see also, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, 
No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 WL 4058745, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that 
where a defendant cannot be found the proper method of alternative service is publication). 
209. Mpafe Order, supra note 65. 
210. Id.
 211. Does It Cost Money To Use Facebook? Is It True That Facebook Is Going To 
Charge To Use the Site?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/186556401394793 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Does It Cost Money To Use Facebook?].
212. In Wisconsin, for example, the cost for publishing six lines in one column in
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newspaper notice can add up if a plaintiff is forced to publish for long 
periods of time in multiple jurisdictions, the cost is negligible in the
context of litigation cost as a whole.213 Moreover, courts often require 
evasive defendants to bear the cost of publication, so the cost is not 
placed on the plaintiff anyways.214 
Although the cost of newspaper service may be small compared to the 
cost of litigation, in contrast to newspaper notice, sending a message to a 
defendant over Facebook or LinkedIn is virtually free.215  While there
are costs associated with work and hiring attorneys, the costs associated
with posting the notice are trivial compared to the rates newspapers
charge.216  Similar to newspapers, Facebook makes most of its money 
through paid advertisements.217  In the first quarter of 2012, eighty-two
percent of Facebook’s revenue came from advertisers.218  However, while
newspaper’s ad revenue is declining, Facebook’s is steady.219 
NOTICES IN THE OFFICIAL STATE NEWSPAPER 2–3 (2013).  By contrast, publication of
legal notice in the Los Angeles Times starts at $117 per day for one column of text. 
Advertiser Services: Legal Notices, LOS ANGELES TIMES, http://placeanad.latimes.com/
legal-notices (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).  Understandably, large newspapers charge
more for their advertising space than smaller newspapers.  Large newspapers, however,
also have a larger circulation, and notice published in their papers or on their websites is
calculated to reach more readers than smaller circulations.  See Howard Fischer, Legal
Notice Changes Could Rock Newspapers, Taxpayers, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Mar. 16, 2013, 
5:00 AM), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/state-and-regional/legal-notice-changes-
could-rock-newspapers-taxpayers/article_fb7ac280-17f1-52de-9ae4-74cd7b775bac.html. 
213. In 2012, the median cost of litigation ranged from $43,000 to $122,000
depending on case type.  Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost
of Civil Litigation, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT7 (Jan. 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/
media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx.  The median automobile suit 
cost $43,000; the median premises liability suit cost $54,000; the median real property
suit cost $66,000; the median employment suit cost $88,000; and the median medical 
malpractice suit cost $122,000. Id.
 214. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2), (d)(5).
215. Does it Cost Money to Use Facebook?, supra note 211; Randy Duermyer, 
Introduction to LinkedIn, ABOUT.COM, http://homebusiness.about.com/od/linkedin/a/how-
does-linkedin-work.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
216. Facebook, for example, asserts that it is a “free site and will never require that
[users] pay to continue using the site.” Does it Cost Money to Use Facebook?, supra
note 211. Setting up a profile is free, and sending messages to other users, even someone the
user is not connected with, is also free. Id. 
217. See MSN Money Partner, supra note 157. 
218. Id. In 2012, Facebook recorded fifty-three million dollars in net income.
Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Feb. 1, 2013). 
219. Over the past few years, a number of newspapers have declared bankruptcy
and many more are in deep financial water. See Tribune Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
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Additionally, while the future of newspapers is uncertain, Facebook 
continues to hold the top social media spot, as well as a stable stock
price.220  Thus, notifying users on Facebook is a financially secure way 
to provide notice for the foreseeable future. 
B. Social Media Service Is More Likely To Be Reasonably      
Calculated To Inform a Defendant of a Lawsuit than
Newspaper Publication
In contrast to print or online newspapers, a defendant is much more 
likely to actually receive notice via social media.  Instead of reading 
newspapers, many people get their news through social media.221 In 
2012, only thirty-eight percent of Americans said they regularly read any 
type of daily newspaper, and twenty-three percent of the population said
they read a print newspaper the day before.222  Moreover, in 2012, 
Americans spent an average of thirty-five percent of their daily allotted
time for news consumption reading print newspapers.223  By contrast,  
they spent an average of eight percent of their news consumption time 
using computers, phones, or tablets.224  Therefore, this limited amount of
time likely will not be enough to click through a newspaper website to
(Dec. 8, 2008, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/tribune-files-for-bankruptcy/?
_r=0; see also Better Know a Lobby—Newspaper Association of America, supra note 171. In
2008, for example, The Tribune Company, owner of several prominent newspapers such 
as the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, filed for bankruptcy.  Tribune Files 
for Bankruptcy, supra. At the time of filing, the Tribune Company had almost $13
billion in debt and only $7.6 billion in assets to cover a portion of that debt.  Id.  By  
contrast, in the third quarter of 2013, Facebook’s revenues doubled, and most of that 
money, about $1.8 billion, came from advertisers.  Vindu Goel, Mobile Ads Fuel a Jump 
in Profit at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/
technology/rising-mobile-ad-sales-propel-facebook-profit.html?_r=0. 
220. When Facebook went public in May 2012, its average monthly adjusted close 
stock price was $29.60. Facebook Historical Prices, YAHOO FINANCE, http://finance.
yahoo.com/q/hp?s=FB&a=04&b=1&c=2012&d=11&e=27&f=2014&g=m (last visited Sept. 
11, 2014). Facebook’s stock price remained steady until July 2013 when it jumped to 
$36.80. Id.  The stock price has since risen steadily, closing with an average monthly 
adjusted stock price of $77.89 on September 2, 2014. Id.
221. Thirty percent of U.S. adults get news on Facebook, ten percent get news on
YouTube, and eight percent get news on Twitter. Jesse Holcomb et al., News Use Across 
Social Media Platforms, PEW RES. JOURNALISM PROJECT (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.
journalism.org/2013/11/14/news-use-across-social-media-platforms/.
222. Number of Americans Who Read Print Newspapers Continues to Decline, supra
note 11. 
223. Rick Edmonds, New Research Finds 92 Percent of Time Spent on News 
Consumption Is Still on Legacy Platforms, POYNTER, http://www.poynter.org/latest-
news/business-news/the-biz-blog/212550/new-research-finds-92-percent-of-news-consumption 
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find out whether a reader has been served via publication.225  In today’s
fast-paced world where newsreaders can quickly check updates on their
preferred topics, legal notices are even less likely to be read by either
print or online newsreaders.226 
In contrast to newspapers and newspapers’ websites, social media is in 
its heyday.  Eighty-five percent of adult Americans use the Internet, and 
seventy-two percent of adult Americans use social networking sites.227 
In contrast to the decline in newspaper readership, this percentage of
adult social media users has rapidly increased from eight percent in 2005.228 
Social media’s popularity among American adults stands in stark contrast to
newspapers; social media users spend an average of 3.2 hours per day on
social networking sites.229  Although young adult social media users ages
eighteen to thirty-four spend the most time on social media at 3.8 hours 
per day, middle age adult users are not far behind at 3 hours per day, and
even older adult users ages fifty to sixty-four spend an average of 2.4 hours
each day on social media.230  Thus, the amount of time social media
users spend on social networking sites is about seven times the amount 
of time they spend reading print newspapers and almost 192 times the 
amount of time they spend reading online newspapers.231  With this huge
225. In fact, fifty-two percent of newsreaders in 2012 stated that they followed 
news about the weather “very closely.”  In Changing News Landscape, Even Television
Is Vulnerable, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.
people-press.org/2012/09/27/section-3-news-attitudes-and-habits-2/. The second most popular
news topic is “crime,” and the third is “people and events in their community.”  Id. Even 
“business and finance” and “politics” are only followed closely by fifteen and seventeen
percent of newsreaders, respectively. Id.
226. Legal news or legal notices did not make the list of news topics that people
follow. Id.
227. Joanna Brenner & Aaron Smith, 72% of Online Adults Are Social Networking
Site Users, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT (Aug. 5, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/
2013/social-networking-sites.aspx; Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW 
RES. INTERNET PROJECT (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Non-
internet-users.aspx. 
228. See Brenner & Smith, supra note 227. 
229. Social Networking Eats Up 3+ Hours per Day for the Average American User, 
MARKETING CHARTS (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.marketingcharts.com/wp/interactive/social-
networking-eats-up-3-hours-per-day-for-the-average-american-user-26049/. 
230. Id.
 231. See Paul Grabowicz, The Transition to Digital Journalism, U.C. BERKELEY 
GRADUATE SCH. OF JOURNALISM (last updated Sept. 7, 2014), http://multimedia.journalism.
berkeley.edu/tutorials/digital-transform/websites/.  People spend an average of twenty-
seven minutes a day reading print newspapers on weekdays and fifty-seven minutes on



















   




   









   
disparity between newspaper readership and social media usage, people 
are much more likely to be on social media, and thus more apt to receive
service on social media than they are to receive service in print or online 
newspapers. Courts are aware of the ramifications of such disparities; as
the court noted in PCCare247, “Particularly where defendants have
‘zealously embraced’ a comparatively new means of communication, it
comports with due process to serve them by those means.”232 
A defendant is no more likely to see a legal notice in an online 
newspaper than in a print newspaper. The reader of an online newspaper 
has to deliberately find the “legal notices” section of the newspaper,
often hidden under a subheading rather than placed in plain view on the 
icon bar, click on the link, and then weed through a list of dry legal 
notices.233  It is unlikely that someone who is not very worried about being
sued or is not interested in legal updates would check the legal notices 
icon on a regular basis. Because the defendant has to weed through an
online newspaper to find notice, it is unlikely that even an online newspaper 
is “reasonably calculated” to apprise a defendant of a lawsuit against 
them.234 
American social media statistics are comparable to foreign country
social media statistics, suggesting that there is no statistical reason to 
allow service through social media for foreign defendants but disallow it 
for domestic defendants.  In a study of twenty-four countries, including 
countries that have allowed social media service such as Australia, Canada, 
and Great Britain, seventy-one percent of those surveyed reported using 
social networks for an average of 3.6 hours a day, not much less than the
United States average.235  Moreover, print newspaper readership is actually 
NW. U. READERSHIP INST. (July 9, 2008), http://getsmart.readership.org/2008/07/news-
flash-readers-have-not-left.html).  By contrast, people spend only a little over one minute
a day on newspaper websites. Id.  This difference may be due to the fact that most people
view online news at work and read print newspapers at home for leisure. Id.
232. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 
841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (citing Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 
F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002)).
233. Texas state representative republican John Stickland opined that “[w]e’d reach
more of the public by putting ads on milk cartons than in newspapers.” Stickland Bill Would 
End Taxpayer Waste to Newspapers, JONATHAN STICKLAND (Jan. 29, 2013), http://jonathan 
stickland.com/2013/29/stickland-bill-would-end-taxpayer-waste-to-newspaper/#sthash.5wFqn
8cM.dpuf.
234. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
235. Social Networking Eats Up 3+ Hours per Day for the Average American 
User, supra note 226. In 2008, Australia became the first jurisdiction to allow service by
Facebook on foreign defendants.  See John G. Browning, Served Without Ever Leaving the 
Computer: Service of Process via Social Media, 73 TEX. B.J. 180, 181 (2010).  Courts in 
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increasing in Asia and Latin America.236  Approximately 2.3 billion people
worldwide read some kind of newspaper, whether print or digital.237  Where 
similar numbers of adults abroad are using social networking sites as
people in the United States, it makes sense that where courts find that
social media is reasonably calculated to serve defendants abroad social 
media is also calculated to reasonably serve defendants in the United 
States.238 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Social media service of process, especially through platforms such as
Facebook, is a way for courts to keep pace with the changing technological 
times and allow a practical method for alternative service. Generally, 
the courts have moved at a much slower pace than the rest of the world 
with embracing technology.  In cases involving international parties,
however, many courts have recognized the sensible benefits of social 
media service and allowed plaintiffs to serve defendants abroad when 
the plaintiffs can authenticate defendants’ profiles and show that notice 
is likely to reach them.  Plaintiffs seeking to serve domestic defendants 
have been left in the dust, however, and only one family court has yet
authorized social media service on a domestic party.  Although many
of the same considerations apply to both foreign and domestic defendants,
courts have been much more reluctant to allow plaintiffs to serve domestic 
defendants through social networking platforms and have instead resorted to
ordering service by newspaper publication.
service by e-mail, Facebook, and in England, by Twitter.  See id. at 182; Ian Llewellyn,
NZ Court Papers Can Be Served via Facebook, Judge Rules, NEW ZEALAND HERALD
(Mar. 16, 2009, 2:22 PM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/ article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=
10561970; see also Van Horn, supra note 1, at 566–68 (describing the above cases in detail). 
236. Larry Kilman, World Press Trends: Newspapers Still Reach More than 
Internet, WORLD ASS’N NEWSPAPERS & NEWS PUBLISHERS (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www. 
wan-infra.org/Press-releases/2011/10/12/world-press-trends-newspapers-still-reach-more-than-
internet.  Additionally, readership remains very high in some countries, such as Iceland, in
which ninety-six percent of the population read a daily newspaper. Id.  Some other countries 
are not far behind. See id.  (noting Japan at ninety-two percent, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
at eighty-two percent, and Finland and Hong Kong at eighty percent).  By contrast, in 2012, only
thirty-eight percent of Americans regularly read newspapers.  See Number of Americans Who
Read Print Newspapers Continues To Decline, supra note 11. 
237. Kilman, supra note 236. 



























Service by publication, however, is quickly becoming outdated and is 
prohibitively expensive compared to social media service.  With domestic
newspaper readership and advertisement revenue declining and online
newspapers unable to make up the difference, service by publication 
does not meet Mullane’s “reasonably calculated to inform” standard,
especially when other types of service better meet the standard.  Social 
media, on the other hand, has grown over the past decade, in both the 
amount of users and the revenues it generates.  With more people using 
social media platforms, especially Facebook, every day for dramatically
more time than they read newspapers, people with active profiles are
more likely to be reasonably notified by Facebook service than publication. 
Although social media service may not be practical for everyday 
service, it is the most practical method available for alternative service 
when an elusive defendant cannot be served through traditional means, 
such as personal service.  Compared to publication, service via social
media has more in common with personal service, especially where a
party can attach the summons and complaint, such as through Facebook.
For states that have catchall provisions in their civil procedure rules that 
allow service on elusive defendants by any means that comply with due
process, attorneys should argue that the court should order social media 
service rather than service by publication.  Using as tools the cases that
allowed Facebook service on international defendants, attorneys can
argue to the court why social media service is the better method of serving
elusive defendants domestically and why it is reasonably calculated to 
notify defendants of a lawsuit against them. 
For states that do not have catchall provisions in their rules, or even 
automatically order service by newspaper publication for elusive defendants, 
change will first have to come from the legislature. Although changing 
state civil procedure rules to explicitly allow social media service may
face strong backlash from newspaper lobbyists, and courts may have 
ethical concerns as well, amending the rules to include catchall provisions is
practical and reasonable. Additionally, courts’ ethical concerns can be
allayed through procedural safeguards to ensure that the person being 
served is the correct person.  By taking these small steps, attorneys and
legislatures can make important, cost-efficient, and practical changes to
the way we serve defendants.  The tagline from the popular film “The 
Social Network” says it all: “You don’t get to 500 million friends without 
making a few enemies.”239 
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APPENDIX A 
1. States that allow service to be made on an elusive defendant only by 
newspaper publication: 
a. ALABAMA: The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure direct, 
“When a defendant avoids service and that defendant’s 
present location or residence is unknown . . . the court may, 
on motion, order service by publication.”  ALA. R. CIV. P. 
4.3(c). 
b. ARKANSAS: When, after “diligent inquiry, the identity or 
whereabouts of a defendant remains unknown,” the Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a warning order be 
published in “a newspaper having general circulation in the 
county where the action is filed.”  ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1)– 
(2). 
c. CALIFORNIA: “A summons may be served by publication if 
upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in 
which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot 
with reasonable diligence be served in another [specified] 
manner.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.50(a) (West Supp. 
2014).
d. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: “In actions specified by subsection 
(b) of this section, publication may be substituted for 
personal service of process upon a defendant who can not be 
found and who is shown by affidavit to be a nonresident, or 
to have been absent from the District for at least six months, 
or against the unknown heirs or devisees of deceased persons.” 
D.C. CODE § 13-336(a) (2001). 
e. FLORIDA: “Where personal service of process . . . cannot be 
had, service of process by publication may be had upon any 
party, natural or corporate, known or unknown . . . .”  FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 49.021 (West Supp. 2014). 
f. GEORGIA: “When the person on whom service is to be made 
resides outside the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or conceals 
himself or herself to avoid the service of the summons . . . 
the judge or clerk may grant an order that the service be 
815











   
   
 
    
 
   
   
made by the publication of summons [in the newspaper] . . . .” 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(f) (2006). 
g. HAWAII: Hawaii provides that the court may order service by 
publication when “a defendant is unknown or does not reside 
within the State or if, after due diligence, the defendant 
cannot be served with process within the State.”  HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 634-23(2) (Supp. 2012). 
h. IDAHO: “When the person on whom the service is to be made 
resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or 
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or 
conceals himself therein to avoid the service of summons . . . 
the court may make an order for the publication of the 
summons . . .”  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-508 (Supp. 2013). 
i. INDIANA: The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure provide that 
when a defendant cannot be found, he can be served 
consistent with service of process for in rem actions.  IND. R. 
TRIAL P. 4.5.  The methods for in rem actions are personal 
service, mail, and newspaper publication.  IND. R. TRIAL P. 
4.9.
j. KANSAS: The Kansas Statutes Annotated provides that 
alternative service “may be made by publication.” KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-307 (2005). 
k. MINNESOTA: When a defendant has departed from the state 
to avoid service, “[s]ervice by publication shall be sufficient 
to confer jurisdiction.”  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a)(1). 
l. MISSISSIPPI: When a defendant cannot be found “on diligent 
inquiry,” the clerk shall publish the summons “once in each 
week during three successive weeks in a public newspaper.” 
MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(4). 
m. MISSOURI: Notice shall be published “in [a] newspaper of 
general circulation” where a defendant has concealed themselves 
or cannot be found.  MO. REV. STAT. § 506.160(3) (2000). 
n. MONTANA: Montana provides that for certain actions, such 
as in rem actions, marriage, and custody actions, a party may 
serve a defendant by publication.  MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(o). In 
other types of actions, where a defendant cannot be found, 
the Secretary of State is designated as an agent to receive 
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o. NEVADA: When a defendant “has departed from the state, or 
cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by 
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons . . . [the 
court] may grant an order that the service be made by the 
publication of summons.” NEV. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1)(i). 
p. NEW JERSEY: New Jersey does not have one specific provision 
for service of process.  However, many of its rules direct that 
service by publication may be made on an elusive defendant. 
See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:65-4, 54:8-6 (Supp. 2013). 
q. NORTH CAROLINA:  “A party that cannot with due diligence 
be served by personal delivery, registered or certified mail, 
or by a designated delivery service . . . may be served by 
publication.” N.C. R. CIV. P. 4(j1). 
r. NORTH DAKOTA: “A defendant, whether known or unknown, 
who has not been served . . . may be served by publication.” 
N.D. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1). 
s. OHIO: The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure direct service by 
publication where a defendant cannot be found within the 
state or the defendant’s residence is unknown.  OHIO R. CIV. 
P. 4.4(a)(1). 
t. PENNSYLVANIA: If a plaintiff, after a good faith effort, is 
unable to serve a defendant, the plaintiff “may move the 
court for a special order directing the method of service.” 
Specifically, this section refers to and is titled “Publication.” 
PA. R. CIV. P. 430. 
u. RHODE ISLAND: When “complete service cannot with due 
diligence be made by another prescribed method, the court 
shall order service by publication of a notice of the action in 
one or more newspapers.”  R.I. R. CIV. P. 4(i). 
v. SOUTH DAKOTA: “Where the person on whom the service of 
the summons . . . cannot, after due diligence, be found within 
the state . . . such court or judge may grant an order that the 
service be made by publication of the summons . . . .”  S.D. 









   
  




   
 
 
    
w. VIRGINIA: When a party has been unable to make service or 
“diligence has been used without effect to ascertain the 
location of the party to be served,” an “order of publication 
may be entered.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316 (2007). 
x. WEST VIRGINIA: West Virginia’s Rules of Civil Procedure 
direct that where “the plaintiff has used due diligence to 
ascertain the residence or whereabouts of the defendant, 
without effect,” service shall be made by publication. 
W. VA. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1)(C). 
y. WISCONSIN: If “with reasonable diligence” a defendant 
cannot be served, “service may be made by mailing and 
publication.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 799.12(4) (West 2012). 
z. WYOMING: If the defendant cannot be served with reasonable 
diligence or if their address cannot be ascertained, upon 
affidavit “the party may proceed to make service by 
publication.”  WYO. R. CIV. P. 4(f). 
2. States that have catchall provisions: 
a. ALASKA: “In its discretion the court may allow service of 
process to be made upon an absent party in any other manner 
which is reasonably calculated to give the party actual notice 
of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, if an order 
permitting such service is entered before service of process is 
made.” ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e)(3). 
b. ARIZONA: The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure provide, “If 
service by one of the means set forth [above] proves 
impracticable, then service may be accomplished in such 
manner, other than by publication, as the court, upon motion 
and without notice, may direct.”  The rules also require that, 
under this rule, “reasonable efforts shall be undertaken by 
the party making service to assure that actual notice of the 
commencement of the action is provided to the person to be 
served.” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1(m). 
c. COLORADO: The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure allow 
service by newspaper publication only for “actions affecting 
specific property or status or other proceedings in rem.” 
COLO. R. CIV. P. 4(g). When a party is not authorized to 
publish service and is otherwise unavailable to accomplish 
service, the court may authorize substituted service 
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“reasonably calculated to give actual notice.” COLO. R. CIV.
P. 4(f).
d. CONNECTICUT: The court may “make such order as is deemed 
reasonable, in regard to the notice which shall be given of 
the institution or pendency of all complaints . . . when the 
adverse party, or any persons so interested therein that they 
ought to be made parties thereto, reside out of the state, or 
when the names or residences of any such persons in interest 
are unknown to the party instituting the proceeding.”  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 52-68(a) (2013). 
e. DELAWARE: Providing that substituted service outside the 
state when “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” may 
be made “[a]s directed by a court.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 3104(d) (2013). 
f. ILLINOIS: “If service upon an individual is impractical . . . 
the plaintiff may move, without notice, that the court enter 
an order directing a comparable method of service. . . . The 
court may order service to be made in any manner consistent 
with due process.”  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-203.1 
(West Supp. 2013). 
g. IOWA: The Iowa Code of Civil Procedure directs that any 
individual, representative, partnership, or corporation may be 
served in any manner “consistent with due process of law 
proscribed by order of the court” when service cannot be 
made by the methods proscribed by the rule.  IOWA R. CIV. 
P. 1.306. 
h. MAINE: “The court, on motion upon a showing that service 
cannot with due diligence be made by another prescribed 
method, shall order service . . . by publication . . . or . . . to 
be made electronically or by any other means not prohibited 
by law.”  ME. R. CIV. P. 4(g)(1). 
i. MARYLAND: The Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure direct 
that when a party has made good faith efforts to serve a 
defendant and it is impracticable to leave service at the 
defendant’s last known residence or place of business, “the 




   
 
 
   
 










    
  
appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably calculated 
to give actual notice.” MD. R. CIV. P. 2-121(c). 
j. MICHIGAN: “On a showing that service of process cannot 
reasonably be made as provided by this rule, the court may 
by order permit service of process to be made in any other 
manner reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual 
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” 
MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.105(I)(1). 
k. NEBRASKA: “Upon motion and showing by affidavit that 
service cannot be made with reasonable diligence by any 
other method provided by statute, the court may permit 
service to be made . . . by publication, or . . . by any manner 
reasonably calculated under the circumstances to provide the 
party with actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity 
to be heard.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02 (2008). 
l. NEW HAMPSHIRE: In New Hampshire, when a defendant is 
not an inhabitant of the state and service cannot be made, the 
court may order “such notice . . . as the case requires.”  N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510:8 (2010). 
m. NEW MEXICO: “Upon motion, without notice, and showing 
by affidavit that service cannot reasonably be made as 
provided by this rule, the court may order service by any 
method or combination of methods, including publication, 
that is reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances 
to apprise the defendant of the existence and pendency of the 
action and afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and 
defend.” N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-004(J). 
n. NEW YORK: New York statute provides that if service is 
“impracticable,” service shall be made “in such a manner as 
the court . . . directs.”  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney Supp. 
2014).
o. OKLAHOMA: “If service cannot be made by personal delivery 
or by mail, a defendant . . . may be served as provided by 
court order in any manner which is reasonably calculated to 
give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an 
opportunity to be heard.”  OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(c)(6). 
p. OREGON: The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide that 
if a defendant cannot be served by any other provided 
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any method or combination of methods which under the
circumstances is most reasonably calculated to apprise the
defendant of the existence and pendency of the action, 
including but not limited to: publication of summons.”  OR.
R. CIV. P. 7(D)(6)(a).
q. SOUTH CAROLINA: “Whenever a statute or an order of court 
provides for service of a summons and complaint or of a 
notice, or an order upon a party not an inhabitant of or found 
within the State, service shall be made under the circumstances 
and in the manner prescribed by the statute, rule, or order.” 
S.C. R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
r. TENNESSEE: Tennessee does not provide a specific rule for 
defendants who cannot be found.  It does, however, provide 
that defendants outside the state, “when reasonably calculated 
to give actual notice” may be served “as directed by the 
court.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 4.05(1)(c). 
s. TEXAS: When the plaintiff shows that personal service or 
service by mail has been attempted, the court may authorize 
service “in any other manner that the affidavit or other 
evidence before the court shows will be reasonably effective 
to give the defendant notice of the suit.”  TEX. R. CIV. P. 
106(b)(2). 
t. UTAH: Utah provides that if a defendant’s whereabouts are 
unknown or cannot be “reasonably ascertained,” the court 
“shall order service of process by means reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties 
of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably 
possible or practicable.”  UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4)(B). 
u. WASHINGTON: “Whenever a statute or an order of court 
thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, 
or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant 
of or not found within the state, service may be made under 
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the 
statute or order, or if there is no provision prescribing the 
manner of service, in a manner prescribed by this rule.” 




   
 
   
 
 
   
   
3. States with miscellaneous provisions or without specific provisions: 
a. KENTUCKY: An elusive defendant is “deemed to have been 
summoned on the 30th day” after the clerk files a warning 
order.  The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure do not specify 
the manner in which a warning order should be issued if any 
address for the defendant is unknown. KY. R. CIV. P. 4.08. 
b. LOUISIANA: Louisiana does not provide specific civil procedure 
rules for substituted service.  It merely provides that “[s]ervice 
of citation or other process may be either personal or 
domiciliary, and except as otherwise provided by law, each 
has the same effect.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1231 
(2005). 
c. MASSACHUSETTS: “If the person authorized to serve process 
makes return that after diligent search he can find neither the 
defendant, nor defendant’s last and usual abode, nor any 
agent upon whom service may be made in compliance with 
this subsection, the court may on application of the plaintiff 
issue an order of notice in the manner and form prescribed 
by law.”  MASS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). 
d. VERMONT: Vermont provides that if no address is known for 
a defendant, service shall be made “by leaving it with the 
clerk of the court.” VT. R. CIV. P. 5(b). 
822
